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No

STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND

THE BILL OF RIGHTS.

By Michael Kent Curtis. Durham, N.C.: Duke
University Press. 1986. Pp. xii, 275. $24.95.

In No State Shall Abridge, Michael Kent Curtis 1 examines the historical underpinnings of a doctrine which is increasingly under attack
as lacking historical support: the incorporation of the Bill of Rights
by the fourteenth amendment. In its barest form, Curtis's claim is that
the framers of the fourteenth amendment intended that the states be
bound to respect all of the individual liberties which, prior to the Civil
War, had been protected against only federal invasion. According to
Curtis, the framers expressed this thought not in the due process
clause, but rather by providing that "[n]o State shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States." 2
The argument that the fourteenth amendment incorporated the
guaranties of the Bill of Rights and applied them to the states is not
new. 3 It came closest to being embraced by a majority of the Supreme
Court in Adamson v. California. 4 Justice Black's dissent in that case5
included an extensive investigation of the congressional history of the
amendment and concluded that incorporation was intended by the
framers. 6 Three of his brethren agreed. 7 Two years later, however, an
immensely influential article by Professor Charles Fairman appeared
refuting Justice Black's reading of history. 8 Since that time many
1. Partner, Smith, Patterson, Follin, Curtis, James & Harkavy, Greensboro, North Carolina.
A.B. 1964, University of the South; J.D. 1969, University of North Carolina. Mr. Curtis has
written extensively on the incorporation of the Bill of Rights by the fourteenth amendment.
2. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
3. In fact, Curtis's particular version of the incorporation doctrine - that it was intended by
the privileges and immunities clause rather than the due process clause - was rejected by the
Supreme Court in a line of post·Civil War cases beginning with the Slaughter-House Cases, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 74 (1873). Curtis devotes an entire chapter to his criticism of these decisions.
Pp. 171-96.
4. 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
5. 332 U.S. at 68 (Black, J., dissenting).
6. Justice Black did not rely on any particular clause of the amendment. Instead, he asserted
that incorporation followed from "the provisions of the Amendment's first section, separately,
and as a whole." 332 U.S. at 71.
7. Justice Douglas joined in Black's dissent, 332 U.S. at 92. Justice Murphy, with whom
Justice Rutledge concurred, voiced "substantial agreement" with Justice Black, 332 U.S. at 123.
However, Justice Murphy wrote separately to voice his opinion that while the fourteenth amendment did indeed incorporate the Bill of Rights, it was not "necessarily limited by the Bill of
Rights." 332 U.S. at 124.
8. Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill ofRights?, 2 STAN. L. REV.
5 (1949).
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commentators have conceded the historical debate to Fainnan. 9
Curtis, however, challenges that concession. Curtis expands the
historical inquiry beyond the congressional debates to the entire historical context of the amendment, a crucial part of which was "the
relation between the concern for the protection of civil liberties and
the crusade to abolish slavery" (p. 29). The amendment, he asserts,
was primarily a product of the Republican-led antislavery crusade
which preceded the Civil War. Although this crusade had as its immediate aim the protection of black slaves in the South, it created a
backlash hallmarked by repression of free blacks in the North and
white abolitionists in the South (p. 31). In "declar[ing] an antislavery
constitutional interpretation" (p. 6), the Republican framers were
strongly influenced by what they regarded as the unconstitutional deprivation by many states of the fundamental liberties embodied in the
Bill of Rights.
The debate over the effect of the fourteenth amendment, says Curtis, is "really a question of the meaning of language" (p. 12). However, he cautions that the language must be read in its historical
context. Thus he proposes to interpret the amendment in light of its
language, the abuses that produced it, the political and legal philosophy of those who proposed it, and the statements made by leading
proponents in the congressional debates (pp. 12-13). After setting
forth these ground rules for the interpretative quest, Curtis proceeds
to examine each step in the amendment process.
Focusing first on the decades leading up to the Civil War (pp. 1856), he notes that the denials of the rights of speech and press that
resulted from attempts to silence abolitionists in the South effectively
prevented the Republican party from campaigning there at all. Even
in the North, the Supreme Court's decisions in the fugitive slave
cases 10 effectively prevented states from protecting the constitutional
liberties of their own free black residents. This history convinced
Republicans that "slavery [was] fundamentally incompatible with a
free society. Its survival required eliminating the basic liberties of all
citizens, white as well as black" (p. 36).
Armed with this understanding of the motivations of the various
members of the Thirty-Ninth Congress, Curtis examines the congressional debates in meticulous detail (pp. 57-91). Here he finds coherence where others found only confusion. Curtis then analyzes some of
the historical arguments against incorporation, criticizing Fairman
and the modem proponent of his views, Raoul Berger, 11 for failing to
9. P. 92. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 174 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting);
Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703, 711-12 (1975).
10. See, e.g., Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
11. Mr. Curtis has been engaged in an on-going debate with Professor Berger over incorporation. See R. BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977); Curtis, The Bill of Rights as a Limitation on State Authority: A
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attach any significance to the fact that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment
was a Republican amendment. It was opposed by the mass of Democrats. But Fairman regularly found the Democrats to be the people
who had a clear understanding of the Bill of Rights question. Republicans, he said, were confused" (p. 100; footnote omitted). Curtis concedes that prevailing Republican legal thought could only be
characterized as "unorthodox" (p. 52) in light of earlier Supreme
Court pronouncements. 12 However, he argues that it was precisely the
point of the fourteenth amendment to overrule these earlier Supreme
Court decisions and secure the status of orthodoxy for Republican
views of civil liberty. "Although [Fairman's] analysis probably accurately reflects the state of constitutional law in 1866, it ignores a Republican consensus on the proper interpretation of the Constitution"
(p. 109). Of course, if Curtis is correct in assessing the Republican
consensus of 1866, then he certainly seems justified in treating prior
precedent as irrelevant to the proper interpretation of the amendment.
As impressive as Curtis's historical evidence is, he is vulnerable to
the charge that he relies on Republican statements of intent to the
exclusion of all others. However, while Curtis draws little support
from members of the Democratic minority, he compensates for this
flaw to some extent by his citation to a wide variety of sources - from
Blackstone (p. 64) to Cardozo (pp. 199-200) - for the proposition
that the phrase "privileges and immunities" has been used before and
after the drafting of the fourteenth amendment to include our most
cherished rights. Certainly, this is what some of the Republicans
meant, and none of the other congressmen challenged this interpretation.13 Thus, the argument is not simply that Republicans intended
that the fourteenth amendment apply the Bill of Rights to the States,
but that they said so by choosing language that any contemporary even from the opposing party - would have understood to have that
meaning.
Reply to Professor Berger, 16 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 45 (1980); Berger, Incorporation of the Bill
ofRights in the Fourteenth Amendment: A Nine-Lived Cat, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 435 (1981); Curtis,
Further Adventures of the Nine Lived Cat: A Response to Mr. Berger on Incorporation of the Bill
of Rights, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 89 (1982); Berger, Incorporation of the Bill of Rights: A Reply to
Michael Curtis' Response, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1983).
12. Republicans repeatedly stated that the Bill of Rights prohibited certain state actions, in
spite of the Supreme Court's conclusion to the contrary in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
243 (1833).
13. P. 91. "John Bingham, the author of the amendment, and Senator Howard, who managed it for the Joint Committee in the Senate, clearly said that the amendment would require the
states to obey the Bill of Rights. Not a single senator or congressman contradicted them. • ••
Today, the idea that states should obey the Bill of Rights is controversial. It was not controversial for Republicans in the Thirty-ninth Congress." P. 91 (emphasis in original).
Curtis points out that it would be inaccurate to have used the phrase "Bill of Rights," because "the rights of American citizens include, but are not limited to, those in the Bill of Rights."
P. 219. See also note 7 supra (discussing Justice Murphy's similar view expressed in his dissent in
Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 124 (1947)).

April-May 1987]

The Federal Courts and the Constitution

1191

In the remaining chapters, Curtis chronicles the treatment which
the amendment received after it was drafted: before the states during
ratification (pp. 131-53), in congressional attempts at enforcement (pp.
154-70), and before the courts (pp. 171-211). The events described in
these later chapters provide further support for Curtis's arguments;
however, they make the book considerably less readable without appreciably enhancing the cogency of the argument. This is the biggest
problem with Mr. Curtis's otherwise excellent book. The main arguments of the book are supported and developed continuously throughout the book as Curtis moves laboriously through each stage of the
drafting process. This choice of chronological rather than thematic
organization relies too much on the sheer volume of Curtis's research
and undervalues the importance of carefully structuring the arguments
he advances. The result is that the considerable power of the thesis is
at times obscured by the mass of evidence in its support. The chronological organization is probably unavoidable, but the thesis might have
been communicated much more effectively if Curtis had spilled more
ink in arguing from his evidence and less in merely presenting it.
Since the Supreme Court has "selectively incorporated" most of
the privileges and immunities in the Bill of Rights anyway, 14 one
might reasonably question the relevance of the issue today. Curtis
removes any such doubts by pointing to recent Supreme Court decisions holding the states to a lesser standard in securing the guaranties
thus incorporated. 15 "The fact that a growing body of political opinion is clamoring to free the states from federal protection of the guaranties of individual liberty contained in the Bill of Rights is a
disturbing development" (p. 211).
If it is disturbing to Mr. Curtis, it is just as encouraging to the
current Attorney General of the United States. As Professor William
W. Van Alstyne points out in a Foreword to the book, Mr. Meese has
recently urged repudiation of the doctrine of incorporation (pp. vii-x).
Moreover, "[t]he fact is that Mr. Meese's point of view does not stand
alone; it is no late Reaganite novelty, and it has troubled some of the
most serious scholars (and judges) of our constitutional history" (p.
ix).
If history is the field on which the interpretative battle will be
14. Significantly, the Court has not settled upon a single rationale for doing so, as Professor
Van Alstyne points out in the Foreword. P. ix.
15. See, e.g., Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356
(1972) (both upholding nonunanimousjury verdicts in state criminal trials); Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78 (1970) (state juries may consist of fewer than twelve jurors). The second Justice
Harlan protested in Williams, 399 U.S. at 118, and in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 171
(1968) (applying the right to a jury trial to the states). that the application of the Bill of Rights to
the states would bring about a dilution of the guaranties in order to make it easier for the states
to comply. It appears that this prediction was accurate. See Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149
(1973) (extending Williams' approval of juries of less than twelve to federal juries).
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fought, then Mr. Curtis has made an invaluable contribution. 16 Until
now, few have taken issue on historical grounds with the Attorney
General's contention that "nothing can be done to shore up the intellectually shaky foundation upon which the [incorporation] doctrine
rests" (p. viii). With No State Shall Abridge, however, Mr. Meese
should be on notice that scholars are rising to the challenge. As Curtis
writes, "The Court can change direction - if it chooses - and allow
states to violate the Bill of Rights. It cannot, however, justify this
result by a fair reading of history" (p. 211).

- Mark A. Grannis

16. Curtis acknowledges, however, that he is unlikely ever to gain an undisputed victory in
the historical battle, due to the nature of historical inquiry: "In a real sense one can never prove
that the amendment was designed to apply the Bill of Rights to the states. One can simply take
the hypothesis and see how well it fits the evidence." P. 217.

